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Abstract
This paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the
rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sec-
tors where a large share is imported from these countries, we extend the `protection for
sale' model to allow for di®erent degrees of substitutability between domestically pro-
duced and imported varieties. The extension suggests that higher levels of protection
towards Chinese goods can be explained by high substitutability between domestically
produced goods and Chinese goods, whereas lower levels of protection towards goods
imported from India can be explained by low substitutability with domestically pro-
duced goods. The data supports the extension to the `protection for sale' model, which
performs better than the original speci¯cation in terms of explaining Latin America's
structure of protection.
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China's and India's fast economic growth during the past decade is paralleled by their in-
creased presence in policy discussions throughout Latin America. The success of the two
Asian economies is not only looked upon with admiration, but is often accompanied by
concerns about the e®ects that growing trade integration with China (and India to a lesser
extent) has on the manufacturing sector throughout the region. Textiles, apparel, shoe
manufacturing and toys are amongst the sectors worst hit by international competition.
In many Latin American countries requests for explicit protection are becoming more
and more common. At the end of 2005, as Brazilian imports of textiles from China surged,
Brazilian manufacturers o±cially asked their government to limit imports of Chinese silk,
velvet and polyester thread by imposing import quotas and/or increasing tari®s. At the time,
they also noted that an additional 70 Chinese products were being reviewed by the textile
industry to determine whether similar protective measures are to be requested. A comuniqu¶ e
by Argentina's Confederation of Medium Enterprises (CAME) calls for not repeating the
\mistakes of the nineties, when an `invasion' of Chinese products destroyed entire sectors of
the manufacturing sector."1
Local politicians have not left these calls for help unanswered. After a recent meeting with
its Chinese counterpart, the Brazilian Minister for Industry, Development and Commerce
Luiz Furlan was quick to highlight that \I made it very clear to Minister Bo Xilai that we
will take the legal steps to give Brazilian industry the right to protect itself".2 In early
2006, and following the earlier demands of Brazilian textile manufacturers, Brazil and China
signed an agreement under which China was to limit its export growth of 70 textile products
to Brazil. Notwithstanding their country's privileged access to the US market, Mexican
politicians show similar feelings and are growing more and more nervous about Mexico's
burgeoning trade de¯cit with China. It is not surprising then that after a recent meeting
with Chinese leaders, president Fox was very happy to report that \Today we heard from
1See CAME's comuniqu¶ e of November 16th 2004 at http://procom.org.ar/comunicado.php3?id=335.
2As reported by Yahoo! on October 4 2005. See http://sg.biz.yahoo.com/051004/1/3veny.htm.
1President Hu his enthusiasm, his help, his support in closing the commercial gap...".3
While GATT-WTO bounds in principle do not allow countries to increase protection vis
µ a vis China and India's products, most developing countries have bound tari®s well above
their applied levels, a situation that de facto enables them to signi¯cantly increase protection
without violating their GATT obligations.4 Similarly, antidumping and safeguard rules are
quite lax and these instruments have been often used by both developed and developing
countries against Chinese imports (at least until China's accession to the WTO).5
Given the substantial degree of °exibility enjoyed by domestic policy makers in imple-
menting trade policies within the WTO rules, we are interested in exploring whether the
characterization of China and India as sources of \cheap" and \unfair" imports has led to
increased protectionism on goods that are heavily imported from the two Asian economies.6
Our initial analysis indicates that this is indeed the case for Latin American imports
from China. Controlling for time, country, and industry ¯xed e®ects and instrumenting the
import share of China and India to account for potential reverse causality, we ¯nd that on
average, tari®s and non tari® barriers tend to be higher for goods that are heavily imported
from China. Goods imported from India, on the other hand, tend to face lower levels of
protection than imports from the rest of the world. Among Latin American regions, this
result holds for the Andean countries, the Southern Cone and Mexico, while in the case of
Central America there is evidence of lower levels of protection on goods imported from both
China and India.
Motivated by this ¯rst-pass empirical evidence, we turn to a more structural explanation
of the di®erences in the levels of protection observed in goods imported heavily from China
3See \Mexico builds trade ties with China" by J.C. McKinley in The New York Times of September 19,
2005.
4For example, Brazil's bound tari® in textiles, apparel and footwear are bound at 35% in the WTO, and
applied tari®s on these products have varied between 16 and 30 percent during the 1990s.
5See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001).
6Below are some common characterizations of China as a source of \cheap" and \unfair" imports: \Coun-
tries around the world are bracing for a surge of cheap imports from China, which bene¯ts from cheap,
union-free labor and rising productivity" Taipei Times, January 2nd 2005. \And a villain always helps. Our
polling indicates that 31% of Americans see China as the country that ignores agreements and breaks rules
the most often." Frank Lutz in Republican Playbook.
2and India. Taking the `protection for sale' model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) as a
starting point, we develop an extended version that incorporates the Armington assumption
by allowing for imperfect substitution between domestic and imported varieties of a good.
In such a setup, trade policy applies only to the imported variety. However, via the de-
gree of substitutability in consumption between the domestic and the imported variety, the
level of protection also a®ects the equilibrium price of the domestic one. Explicitly taking
into account this dependency, all pay-o®s can be expressed in terms of the tari®. Solving
the model, the degree of pass-through of trade policy into domestic prices, which in turn
depends on the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported varieties, enters
multiplicatively in the tari® equation of the extended model.
Our extension suggests that if Chinese exports are closer substitutes to domestically
produced goods in Latin America than imports from the rest of the world, then one would
observe higher protection levels on goods heavily imported from China. Similarly, if goods
imported from India tended to be less substitutable with domestically produced goods, then
we will observe lower levels of protection on goods heavily imported from India. The reason
is that domestic lobbying forces are stronger on goods that are close substitutes to what is
domestically produced. Our estimates con¯rm that China's imports are closer substitutes
to domestically produced goods than imports from the rest of the world, whereas goods
imported from India tend to be more distant substitutes to domestically produced goods.
This is consistent with the fact that Latin America's private sector and policy makers
seem to be relatively more concerned about China's growing presence than India's imports.7
Also recent estimates by Calder¶ on (2006) suggests that the correlation of output between
China and LAC is generally higher than for India and LAC. Moreover, 60 percent of the
explained variation in these output correlation is attributed to time e®ects suggesting that
China and LAC tend to be a®ected by similar exogenous shocks. This provides indirect
evidence that China produces goods that are closer substitutes to LAC goods than the ones
produced by India.
7A thorough search of the Latin American press between 2005 and 2006 reveals that China receives by
far more attention than India.
3We then estimate the extended model that accommodates for imperfect substitution
between goods imported from di®erent regions, and domestically produced goods, using the
classic `protection for sale model' (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) as a benchmark. The
extended model performs better than the traditional `protection for sale model' along two
dimensions: ¯rst, it explains better the tari® structure of Latin America economies (in terms
of R-squared and a non-nested speci¯cation J test); and second, the results are economically
more reasonable. Indeed, the weight that the government puts on social welfare relative to
industry lobbying is closer to what common sense suggests. In particular, in our sample of
Latin American countries, governments' weight on industry lobbying is on average 32 percent
of the weight governments attaches to social welfare; and is as high as 89 percent for Central
American countries. This is in contrast to the traditional model estimates, where the weight
governments put on industry lobbying represent less than 1 percent of the weight attached
to social welfare.8
The imperfect substitutability of imported and domestic varieties in the context of the
protection-for-sale model has been introduced ¯rst by Chang (2005). In this paper, the
author develops a framework featuring Dixit-Stiglitz like di®erentiated goods sectors and
analyzes the e®ects that this market structure has on the trade policy outcome of the lobbying
game. As she correctly points out, her framework is ideally suited to study the intra-industry
trade °ows that dominate North-North trade.9 In our theoretical model we instead stop
short of such a change in the market structure, because we are interested in South-South
and North-South trade. Furthermore, and more importantly, we want to allow for di®erent
elasticities of substitution vis-µ a-vis di®erent source countries, a generalization that cannot be
easily introduced in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. For these reasons, we use a simpler, perfectly
8This is a well-known problem of the empirical literature on `protection for sale' (see Gawande and
Krishna, 2004 for a careful discussion). Similar results were obtained by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for the United States. McCalman (2004) found that industry
lobbying accounts for 2 percent of the Australian government objective function and Mitra et al. (2002)
found that industry lobbying accounts for 1 percent of the Turkish government's objective function. See also
by Facchini et al. (2006) and Mitra et al. (2006).
9Chang and Lee (2005) allow for both monopolistically as well as perfectly competitive sectors when
empirically implementing the Chang (2005) model.
4competitive setup that, while foregoing the rent shifting e®ects of Chang's model, allows us
to establish unambiguously the e®ect of the elasticity of substitution on trade policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some prima-facie evidence
regarding Latin American tari®s on goods heavily imported from China and India. In section
3 we develop the extension to Grossman and Helpman's (1994) \protection for sale" model.
Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Is LAC protection stronger against goods imported
from China and India?
In order to answer this question we start by exploring the correlation between Latin America's
structure of protection and the relative importance of China and India as a source of imports.
This exercise is undertaken at the highest level of disaggregation that is possible for trade
data to be internationally comparable: the six digit level of the Harmonized System. We
consider the 1992-2004 period and the country coverage and data sources are discussed in
the Data Appendix.
Latin America's overall average import-weighted tari® on world's imports is 13 percent.
The import-weighted tari® on imports from China and India is 9 percent higher. The largest
protectionist bias towards China and India is to be found in Central American and Andean
countries with average levels of protection that are 66 and 26 percent higher, respectively,
on imports from China and India than on imports from the rest of the world. But tari®s
are only part of the story. Anti{dumping duties, quantitative restrictions and technical
regulations have become an important and often more arbitrarily used instrument for trade
protection. Latin America's import-weighted overall level of protection (i.e., including ad-
valorem equivalents of non tari® barriers) on overall world's imports is 27 percent (Kee,
Nicita and Olarreaga 2006), and on imports from China and India 10 percent higher. The
largest protectionist bias against China and India, once we include ad-valorem equivalents
of non tari® barriers, is to be found in the Southern Cone, with average levels of protection
520 percent higher on imports from China and India than on imports from the rest of the
world.
But one has to be careful before interpreting these averages as evidence that imports
from China and India lead to higher tari®s in Latin America. There are two important
issues that need to be addressed before we can reach such a conclusion. First, the causal
relation could well go in the opposite direction. In other words, higher tari®s may hit harder
the less competitive trading partners, and this may lead to a growing share of imports from
China and India. Secondly, our correlations might be a®ected by endogeneity bias, as the
products in which China and India have a comparative advantage might be those in which
Latin American countries have the highest protection because of internal political economy
forces, that have little to do with imports from either China or India. For example, China
and India are likely to have a comparative advantage in unskilled labor intensive industries,
and these are the sectors which have the strongest political clout in Latin America.
We address the ¯rst problem by instrumenting the share of imports from China and India
with their share in world trade by product, and the capital-labor ratio of the United States
in each industry. The underlying assumption is that individual Latin American countries'
tari®s are neither a®ecting the overall competitiveness of China and India in world markets,
nor the capital-labor ratio of industries in the United States. We believe these to be relatively
reasonable assumptions, as none of the Latin American countries in our sample represents
more than 2 percent of world trade. We address the omitted variable problem by introducing
country, year and 2 digits industry ¯xed e®ects. Doing so allows us to address, for instance,
the possibility that China might have a comparative advantage in sectors that happen to be
strongly protected in Latin America, to the extent that the forces for comparative advantage
in China and India, and for protection in Latin America, do not vary (too much) within 2
digits industries.
Thus, the equation to be estimated takes the following form:
tk;c;t = ¯0 + ¯IIk22 digit;c;t + ¯mmk;c;t + ¯Ssk;c ;t + ¹k;c;t (1)
6where tk;c;t is the level of protection on good k (at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System) in country c at time t, Ik22 digit;c;t are a full set of product ¯xed e®ects (at the level
of the 2 digit Harmonized system) that vary by country and year, mk;c;t are imports and
sk;c;t is the share of imports that comes from China and India in sector k of country c at
time t; ¹k;c;t is a mean zero error term. We use two speci¯cations. In the ¯rst we include the
overall share of imports from China and India, while in the second we introduce the share
of imports from China and India separately.
The instrumental variable results are reported in Tables 1 and 2 for a pool of 10 Latin
American countries, and four sub-regions: Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and
Venezuela), Central America (Costa Rica and Nicaragua), Mexico, and the Southern Cone
(Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay). Table 1 reports results using tari®s as the endogenous
variable, and Table 2 reports results using ad-valorem equivalents of non tari® barriers as
well. Because the ad-valorem equivalents are only available for the year 2001, there is no
time variation in the results reported in Table 2.1011
With the exception of Central America, tari®s throughout the region tend to be higher
on goods imported from China and India. As it turns out though, this result is mainly driven
by China. In fact, when we separately include the import shares of China and India in the
regressions, the share of imports from China enters positively (with the exception of Central
America again), and is statistically signi¯cant, whereas the share of imports from India
is negative and statistically signi¯cant, suggesting lower tari®s on goods heavily imported
from that country. Note, however, that the (positive) impact of China's import share is
consistently substantially larger than the impact of India's import share. This result is likely
to illustrate the relative importance of these two countries as a source of imports for Latin
America, but it also indicates that the protectionist bias towards goods imported from China
is much larger than the anti-protectionist bias towards goods imported from India.12
10All ¯rst-stage regressions are highly statistically signi¯cant with F-statistics agreater than 20 and p-
values lower than 0.0001. The results of ¯rst-stage regressions are available upon request.
11For data sources and variable descriptions see the Data Appendix.
12We have also experimented estimating equation (1) controlling for the presence of preferential trade
agreeements and for the accession of China as a WTO member. In the former case, we used ¯xed e®ects to
7Does the pattern of higher protection applied to Chinese goods and lower protection
applied to Indian goods hold when we consider non tari® barriers as well? The answer is
positive and the results are reported in Table 2, where we use the same speci¯cation as in
Table 1, but add to the six digit Harmonized System tari®s the ad-valorem equivalents of non
tari® barriers obtained by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).13 The statistical signi¯cance
of the estimates is not as high as for those in Table 1, but the same pattern is present. Note
that we do not have results for Central American countries, because there are no estimates
available for the trade restrictiveness of their non tari® barriers.14
In sum, sectors characterized by a larger share of imports from China tend to receive
higher protection, while sectors characterized by a larger share of imports from India tend
to face lower levels of protection. While we think that this evidence is per se important,
to provide an explanation for these patterns we extend the Grossman and Helpman (1994)
`protection for sale' model to allow for imperfect substitution between domestically produced
goods and imported goods. We then bring the extended model to the data.
3 Introducing imperfect substitution in the protection
for sale model
To analyze the political economy consequences of increased commercial ties with emerging
economies such as China and India, we consider a model in which a small open economy sets
trade policy vis-a-vis imports from the rest of the world (ROW). The key hypothesis in our
model is that goods are di®erentiated by location of origin, that is, we adopt the Armington
assumption and regard imports and domestically produced varieties as imperfect substitutes.
control for the presence of preferential agreeements. In the latter case, we have also used as an explanatory
variable the interaction between the share of imports from China and a dummy variable which is equal to
one after the year of 2000. The results described above remain intact and the regression results are available
upon request.
13Note that these estimates only exist for the year 2001, so we lost the time dimension in our sample.
Results reported in Table 2 are for the year 2001 only.
14The ¯rst-stage regressions used to compute the results in table 2 are in general highly statistically
signi¯cant. The ¯rst-stage results are available upon reuqest.
8Our model features n + 1 di®erent types of goods, and we allow each type to be produced
either domestically or imported from abroad. Later on we will allow for three di®erent types
of imported goods, depending on whether they originate in India, China or elsewhere. The
extension is straightforward and thus to simplify the presentation of the extended model we
focus on a composite imported variety.15
Indicating by subscript k the type of good, consumers in the home country maximize the
following quasi-linear utility function:




where Uk(:) are strictly concave subutility functions (Uk = Ek lnXk, that is, an upper tier
Cobb-Douglas) that depend on a CES aggregate of the imported and domestic variety of the









½k 0 < ½k < 1 (3)
where xk;d stands for the consumption of the domestic variety of good k 2 f1;:::;ng, xk;i
is the consumption of the imported variety, ¾k = 1
1¡½k > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between the two varieties, and good zero is the num¶ eraire. Note that quasi{linearity implies
that there is neither an income nor a substitution e®ect for non-num¶ eraire goods, as is
standard in the protection for sale model.
The supply side is a speci¯c-factor model where the primary inputs are sector-speci¯c
capital and mobile labor. Each individual in this economy is endowed with labor and at most
one sector{speci¯c input. The speci¯cs of supply in each sector are summarized by pro¯t
functions ¼k(pk;d), where pk;d is the price of the domestic variety. To make things tractable,
we are going to work with linear supply schedules, i.e. we will assume that the pro¯t functions
are quadratic. Production of good zero uses only labor under constant returns to scale, and
by appropriate choice of unit its price as well as the wage rate are normalized to one.
15Di®erent varieties in a protection for sale model under monopolistic competition have been analyzed by
Chang (2005).
9For an individual with income E the maximization of equation 2 subject to the budget
constraint E = X0 +
Pn
k=1(pk;dxk;d + pk;ixk;i) yields the following demands for the domestic



























where pk;i = p¤
k + tk is the price of the imported variety that results as the sum of the
exogenous world market price and the import tari®, and Ek is the expenditure on good k
(see the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas above). Note that | in line with a substantial part
of the literature and in view of the goal of this paper | we do not explicitly consider export
policies.
The price of the domestic variety results from the interplay of domestic supply and
domestic demand, where the latter varies not only with the price of the domestic variety
but also with the price of the imported variety, and this relation depends on the degree of
substitutability. In particular, setting demand equal supply in the market for the domestic




k + tk;½k) (6)
as a function of the price of the imported variety, where the relationship depends on the
elasticity of substitution. To obtain further insights into the relationship between the price
of the domestic variety and the price of the imported variety, and on how it is in°uenced by
the elasticity of substitution, we assume that the supply of the domestic variety takes the
following linear form:
10yk;d = pk;d (7)















Since we are unable to explicitly solve for pk;d, we proceed by totally di®erentiating the











d½k = 0 (9)
We are interested in analyzing the relationship between the price of the domestic and
foreign varieties, i.e.
dpk;d










































k;i ]2(½k ¡ 1)
; (12)
It is easy to show that both the numerator and the denominator are positive, since 0 < ½k < 1.
We have thus established that
dpk;d
dpk;i ¸ 0, i.e. that the price of the domestic variety increases
if the price of the imported variety does, for example because of an increase in the tari®.
11How does a change in the substitutability between the two varieties a®ect the relationship
between the price of the domestic and the imported varieties? First, consider two extreme
cases at each end of the spectrum: If the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and
the imported variety equals one (½k ! 0), we are in the case of a Cobb-Douglas aggregator.
In this case, the price of the domestic variety is una®ected, in other words dpk;d=dpk;i = 0. On
the other hand, if the domestic and the imported varieties are perfect substitutes (½k ! 1),
a change in the price of the imported variety translates one-for-one (dpk;d=dpk;i = 1) into
the price of the domestic variety. This puts us back in the standard framework of the
Grossman-Helpman protection for sale model.16
To analyze intermediate cases and to show more formally that dpk;d=dpk;i is increasing in























Solving explicitly, this can be shown to be positive under reasonable conditions (see the
appendix). We can therefore conclude that p0
k ´ dpk;d=dpk;i is a positive function of ½k.
3.1 Lobbying Game
We model the lobbying game along the lines of Grossman and Helpman familiar protection
for sale model, assuming for simplicity that all sectors are organized.17 In the ¯rst stage,
owners of sector speci¯c capital in the home country lobby the government for advantageous
trade policies on imported substitutes. In particular, they o®er contribution schedules Ck(t)
that depend on the full vector of import tari®s. Each individual enjoys a consumer surplus
CS(t) =
P
k [Uk(Xk(pk;d;pk;i)) ¡ pk;d(p¤
k + tk)xk;d ¡ (p¤
k + tk)xk;i] and receives also a lump




k +tk), that are rebated to the public on an equal, per capita basis.
16If both varieties were complementary (½k < 0) then we would obtain a negative correlation between the
two prices, a case we do not consider as we are modeling two varieties of the same good.
17For a similar approach, see Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Mitra et al. (2006).
12Note that both these components depend on the price of the domestic variety and we have
made use of expression (6) to express them in terms of tari®s.
Assuming that the ownership of the speci¯c factor is highly concentrated in the popu-
lation, and in particular that the factor owners represent a negligible fraction of the total
population, the objective function of each organized group can be approximated by
Wk(t) = lk + ¼k(t) (14)
where lk is the total labor supply (and also labor income) of the owners of the speci¯c input
used in industry k. In the second stage, each government chooses trade policy and collects





Ck(t) + aW(t) (15)
where t is the vector of tari®s applied by the Home country and a is the weight the gov-
ernment puts on social welfare in its objective function. W(t) denotes the aggregate social
welfare function, which is de¯ned as follows:
W(t) = L +
X
k
¼k(t) + CS(t) + TR(t) (16)
where L denotes the labor force (hence labor income because w = 1).
Because we do not have information on political organization by sector in Latin America
(i.e., there is no legal requirement for public disclosure of industries' political contributions),
when solving for the optimal tari® we will assume that all industries are organized (which
is not unreasonable given the high level of industry aggregation in our data), and that
contribution functions are di®erentiable (i.e. locally truthful).
















k ´ tk=pk;i is the ad valorem tari®, zk ´ xk;d=xk;i is the inverse import penetration
ratio, and ²k is the total price elasticity of import demand that consists of the direct price
e®ect and the cross-price e®ect due to the tari®'s impact on the domestic price.18 The last
term is the main innovation vis-µ a-vis the standard model (p0
k is given by equation (10)).
We have shown above that it depends positively on the elasticity of substitution. Thus in
the presence of high substitution between domestically produced goods and imported goods,
tari®s are likely to be higher.
4 Empirical Analysis
To assess the ability of our model to explain the patterns of protection towards Chinese
and Indian imports we have highlighted in our preliminary data analysis, we proceed in two
steps. First, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between the domestically produced
variety of a given good and the varieties respectively imported from China, India and the
rest of the world. For our model to be compatible with the data, the estimated elasticity of
substitution between domestically produced and Chinese produced varieties should be higher
than the elasticity of substitution between the domestic variety and the variety imported
from the rest of the world. The opposite should hold for the Indian imported varieties.
Next, we compare the performance of our model against the standard Grossman and
Helpman benchmark. If product heterogeneity is important, we expect our model to ¯t
better the data than the standard benchmark.













144.1 Estimating the substitutability between domestically produced
goods and imports from China and India
We follow the strategy described in Sato (1967) to estimate the substitutability between
imported varieties of good k and the domestically produced good k. Denote imports of good
k form China, India and the rest of the world respectively by xk;C, xk;I, and xk;ROW. Assume











where Áj > 0, xk;j represents imports of good k from country j ² fC; I; ROWg, and ¾k;i
= 1
1¡°k denotes the elasticity of substitution among imported varieties of good k. With this
nested CES preference structure Sato (1967) worked out the relationship between ¾k;i, ¾k,
and the elasticity of substitution between the domestically produced variety of good k and




























for j ² fC; I; ROWg (19)
where µk;j is the share of total expenditure on the imported variety of good k from region j,
µk;i is the share of total expenditure on imports of that good (i.e., µk;i =
P
j µk;j), and µk;d
is the share of total expenditure on the domestic variety of good k.
Using equation (5) we can derive the price elasticity of the composite of imported goods,
²k. Solving for ¾k we have ¾k = ¡²k. Thus, with an estimate of the price elasticity of the
imported composite good k that can be borrowed from the existing literature, we can derive
an estimate for ¾k. With data on ¾k and on the share of expenditure on domestic and on
imported varieties we can use the relationship described in equation (19) to obtain estimates
15for the degree of substitutability between domestically produced goods and respectively
imports from China, India and the rest of the world.19
Before bringing equation (19) to the data, notice that the shares of expenditure on
domestic and imported varieties appear in the left and right-hand sides of expression (19).
Therefore, we need to rearrange the expression to be able to estimate the parameters of























´ + "k for j ² fC; I; ROWg (20)
where ®1;j = 1






are the parameters of interest, while "k is a zero mean
error term that captures measurement errors in the dependent variable. ¾j can be estimated
by calculating 1/®1;j. Expression (20) is the basis for our estimation of the relative degrees
of substitutability between the domestically produced and the goods imported from di®erent
regions. Results are discussed in subsection 4.3.
4.2 Does the extended model perform better?
In order to assess whether the extended model with imperfect substitution between domes-
tically produced goods and imported goods performs better than the traditional `protection
for sale' model with homogeneous goods, we will run both models on our sample of Latin
American countries: the extended model provided by equation (17) and the traditional model
where the last term in equation (17) is not present. We will then explore which of the two
models better explains Latin America's tari® structure by comparing the R-squared of the
two regressions and by applying Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) non-nested J-test.20
19Note though that in our empirical analysis we will only be able to capture the average degree of substi-
tutability ¾C; ¾I, and ¾ROW, as we have too few observations to estimate sector speci¯c elasticities.
20This consists of running the two speci¯cations, taking the predicted value of each speci¯cation and adding
the predicted of the alternative speci¯cation to the null speci¯cation. If the predicted value is statistically
signi¯cant, then we cannot reject that the alternative is the right speci¯cation. The problem with this test
is that we may not be able to reject either of the alternatives, or we may be able to reject both, i.e., the test
may be inconclusive.
16We will also assess the two speci¯cations in terms of their economic signi¯cance. One
problem with the empirical literature on the `protection for sale' model is that the estimates
obtained for a, the parameter describing the weight attached by the government to aggregate
welfare, are unreasonably high (see Gawande and Krishna, 2004 for a survey of the empirical
literature). According to the existing estimates of the traditional `protection for sale' model
with homogeneous goods, the weight attached by the government on industry lobbying when
setting trade policy represents less than 1 percent of the weight the government puts on social
welfare. This is hardly consistent with observed behavior and tari® structures. If we were
to obtain a lower, and more reasonable estimate for a when bringing our extended model to
the data, we would have evidence suggesting that our framework is also economically more
meaningful.
Note that in order to estimate the extended model, we need an estimate for p0
k, the
derivative of domestic prices with respect to the price of the composite imported good,
which we have de¯ned in (10). Substituting in (10) the derivative of domestic demand with
respect to the price of the domestic (equation 11) and of the foreign variety (equation 12),


































To be able to estimate p0
k, we need data on the prices of the domestic and the composite
imported good, as well as consumer expenditure in sector k. The relative price between
the domestic good and the composite imported good is obtained using the two ¯rst order
conditions of the consumer maximization problem. More precisely, we take the ratio between
(4) and (5) and solve for the relative price. The quasi-linear structure of the theoretical
framework implies that there are neither income nor substitution e®ects for non-numeraire
goods. Thus, the model allows us to assume that the price of the imported good in every
17sector is equal to one. Consumption is readily obtained from trade and production data.21
We use then equations (4) and (5) to calculate the price of the domestic varieties. One
concern we have when constructing p0
k in this fashion is measurement error, but we instrument
the term p0
k jointly with the rest of the right hand side term to address this problem.
Finally, a well-known problem with the estimation of the `protection for sale' model in its
traditional or extended form is the endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables. In order to
correct for this we use as instruments China and India's share in world trade by product, and
the capital-labor ratio of the United States in each industry. The results of the estimation of
the extended and traditional `protection for sale model' as well as the ¯rst-stage regressions
are discussed in the next section (4.3).
4.3 Results
We start by discussing the results of the estimation of the degree of substitutability between
domestically produced goods and varieties that are imported from either China, India or the
rest of the world. We estimate equation (20) using data on imports from China, India, and
rest of the world separately. Parameter estimates obtained for equation (20), as well as the
implied ¾'s are reported in Table 3. A quick look suggests that the degree of substitution
between Chinese goods and goods produced domestically in Latin America { as measured by
¾C { is higher than the degree of substitution between goods imported from the rest of the
world and domestically produced goods { as measured by ¾ROW { using data on the entire
sample of Latin American countries, on Andean countries and Southern cone countries. The
estimates for ¾C is numerically and statistically larger than the estimates for ¾ROW, with
the exception of Mexico and Central America. The results for ¾I are statistically di®erent
from zero in all regions, with the exception of Central America. However, the comparison
between ¾ROW and ¾I does not generate a clear result, and in some cases the di®erence
between these parameters is not statistically di®erent from zero.
Table 4 provides the results of the estimation of (17) and the traditional `protection for
21Or rather apparent consumption which equals imports plus domestic production minus exports.
18sale model' for the entire pooled sample and the four sub-regions. Results for the pooled
sample, and for the Southern Cone always have the expected positive sign on the coe±cient
of the GH term and of the extended GH term. For Andean countries, Central America, and
Mexico the coe±cient is negative when using the traditional GH speci¯cation, which is at
odds with theory. This coe±cient is instead positive for the extended GH speci¯cation, a
result that is consistent with our theoretical predictions. In fact, in all cases the extended
GH coe±cient has the expected sign and is statistically di®erent from zero.
Our results also suggest that the extended GH model performs better in terms of R-
squared, suggesting that the extended model, that allows for imperfect substitutability be-
tween domestic and imported varieties, ¯ts better the data. The Davidson-McKinnon non-
nested J test for model speci¯cation indicates that the extended GH model dominates the
model with homogenous goods using either the pooled sample or the data by sub-regions.
As it can be seen from (17) the coe±cient in front of the GH term (both in its traditional
and extended form) is given by 1=a, i.e., the inverse of the weight the government puts
on social welfare relative to industry lobbying when setting trade policy. In the case of the
extended GH model we obtain estimates for this parameter that are all positive (as expected)
and statistically di®erent from zero.
More interestingly, the estimates for the weight the governments put on welfare relative
to industry lobbying are more realistic than the ¯gures obtained in the existing literature. In
fact, for the extended GH model, they oscillate between 1 and 5, rather than ranging from
negative to between 900 and 1600 (or even negative) as in the traditional GH model. Allowing
for imperfect substitution between domestically produced goods and imported goods thus
provides one possible solution to the puzzle of large estimates of a. In fact, the results from
the traditional GH model would suggest that the relative weight the government puts on
industry lobbying is around 0.1 percent of the weight put on social welfare for the pooled
LAC sample (0:001 = 1=[a = 918])). If this were the case, assuming no other market
imperfections, it would be very di±cult to explain the high levels of trade protection that
can be observed in Latin America. On the other hand, the estimates from the extended
19GH model suggest that the weight attached by the government on industry lobbying is 32
percent of the weight it puts on social welfare (0:32 = 1=([a = 3:16])), suggesting a much
larger scope for lobbies' in°uence. Governments with the least concern for social welfare are
to be found in Central America (where a is estimated at 1.12), and the governments with the
highest concern for social welfare are to be found among Andean countries with an average
a estimated at 4.73.22
Table 5 shows the ¯rst-stage regression results which were used to obtain the results
displayed in table 4. The F-statistics indicate that the instrumental variables used to estimate
the traditional GH model are statistically signi¯cant for the pooled sample, for the Andean
and for the Mercosur countries, and for Mexico. There is no evidence that the instrumental
variables are suitable in estimating the traditional GH model for Central American countries.
The F-test indicates that the instrumental variables are jointly signi¯cant for the pooled
sample and for all sub-region when estimating the extended GH model. In most cases, the
F-statistics is greater than 10 in the extended GH model's ¯rst stage regressions. Since we
have a single endogenous regressor, these results reinforce our belief in the appropriateness
of the instrumental variables used to estimated the extended GH model.23
5 Conclusion
The growing presence of China and India in world markets and as a source for Latin American
imports has caught policy makers attention. This paper explores the response of Latin
American policy-makers to growing imports from China and India in their markets. We
found that sectors in which the share of imports from China is growing, generally tend to
have higher tari®s, controlling for reverse causality and industry, year and country e®ects.
22We also estimate (17) and the traditional `protection for sale model' using the overall level of protection
that includes ad-valorem equivalents of non tari® barriers as the left hand side variable. Results for the
pooled sample suggest that the parameter a equals 898 in the case of the traditional GH model, and is equal
to 2.17 in the case of the extended GH model. However none of the estimates of the traditional GH model
are statistically di®erent from zero (although they are di®erent from each other). In the case of the extended
GH model, the estimates for the pooled sample as well as for Mercosur countries are statistically signi¯cant
and have the expected sign. The results for the other sub-regions are not statistically signi¯cant.
23This observation follows from the \rule of thumb" suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
20The reverse pattern is observed in sectors where India's presence is growing.
In order to explain this evidence, we develop an extension to the Grossman and Helpman
(1994) `protection for sale' model to allow for imperfect substitution between domestically
produced goods and goods imported from di®erent regions. The model suggest that as the
elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods and imported goods increases,
the incentives to lobby also increase, and the resulting equilibrium tari® is higher.
Our analysis has been carried out in two steps. First, we have studied the substitutability
of domestically produced goods with imports from either China, India or the rest of the
world. We have found that Chinese imports are on average closer substitutes to goods
domestically produced in Latin America countries than goods originating in the rest of the
world, while the opposite is true for goods originating in India. Next, we have brought our
extended protection for sale framework to the data. We have shown that it outperforms the
traditional Grossman Helpman framework in two respects. First of all, it ¯ts better the data.
Secondly, and even more interestingly, explicitly modeling imperfect substitutability between
domestic and imported varieties allows us to obtain substantially more realistic structural
parameter estimates than the ones obtained using an homogenous good speci¯cation.
A possible explanation for this result is that by ignoring the imperfect substitutability
between imported and domestically produced goods the existing literature is obtaining es-
timates for the weight attached by the government to aggregate welfare that are upward
biased. In fact, by assuming that imported goods and domestic varieties are perfect substi-
tutes, we would be led to conclude that the large variation observed in the political economy
term of the Grossman Helpman model (zk=²k) translates into a relatively small variation in
the level of protection because of the large weight attached by the government to aggregate
welfare. If we instead allow for our more general setting, the reason for which the govern-
ment does not react is not that it cares mainly about social welfare, but rather that there is
no lobbying pressure when imported goods are very imperfect substitutes for domestically
produced goods.
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23Appendix
There are two parts to this appendix. First, we calculate the derivative of the domestic
prices with respect to the degree of substitutability between domestically produced goods
and imported goods. Second, we describe the data used in our analysis.
Derivative of p0
k with respect to ½k
Di®erentiating (21) with respect to ½k, setting all international prices equal to 1, and denoting































(1 ¡ ½k + ½klog(pk)) + p
½k
½k¡1


























(½k ¡ 1) (22)
Rearranging, it can be shown that a su±cient condition for the right hand side of (22)
to be positive is jlog(pk)j = jlog(pk;d) ¡ log(pk;i)j < (1 ¡ ½k)=½k. Intuitively, this condition
requires that the more substitutable are the domestic and the foreign varieties, the stronger
must be the cross price e®ect than the own price e®ect.
24Data Appendix
There are 10 Latin American countries in our sample (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela), which represent more than 90
percent of Latin America's GDP. Results are either reported for the whole pooled sample
or for four sub-regional samples: Andean (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela), Central
America (Costa Rica and Guatemala), Mexico, and the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil
and Uruguay).
The countries in the sample are those for which we have data available on tari®s, trade,
output, and elasticities of import demand during the period 1992-2004, all of which are
needed to estimate (17).24
Trade data comes from United Nations Comtrade, the output data comes from Unido,
and tari® data from UNCTAD's TRAINS. For a discussion of data availability see Nicita and
Olarreaga (2006). Data ad-valorem equivalents of non tari® barriers comes from Kee, Nicita
and Olarreaga (2006). The elasticities of import demand are borrowed from Kee, Nicita and
Olarreaga (2004).
Table A provides some summary statistics of levels of protection vis-µ a-vis the world and
vis-µ a-vis China and India for LAC and each of the sub-regions considered in the paper. The
¯rst column provides the import-weighted MFN tari®s in 2001, and the second column the
marginal increase in protection vis-µ a-vis China and India (i.e., using imports from China
and India as weights). The third and fourth column provide similar statistics but using the
overall level of protection in 2001, that is including the AVEs of non tari® barriers in Kee,
Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). Thus, in Latin America, the import-weighted tari® on imports
from the world is 13 percent. The import-weighted tari® on imports from China and India
is 9 percent higher. Similarly, the import-weighted overall level of protection (i.e., including
ad-valorem equivalents of non tari® barriers) on imports from the world is 27 percent, and
on imports from China and India 10 percent higher.
24We also had data for Chile, but because it has has a uniform tari® structure, there is little to explain.
We therefore decided to drop Chile from our sample.
25Table A: Average Levels of protection vis-µ a-vis the world, and China and India in 2001.a
Tari®s, 2001 Overall level of protection, 2001
World China & India World China & India
Andean countries 11 +26% 23 -4%
Central America 5 +66% NA NA
Mexico 11 +13% 24 +9%
Southern Cone 15 +9% 30 +19%
Latin America 13 +9% 27 +10%
aAll averages are import-weighted. For China and India, we provide the change in protection with respect


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 3: Estimating the degree of substitutability with domestically produced goodsa
Latin Andean Central Mexico Southern
America Countries America Cone
®1;ROW 0.091?? 0.087?? 0.031?? 0.165? 0.115??
(Rest of the world) (0.009) (0.014) (0.023) (0.055) (0.016)
¾ROW 10.989?? 11.507?? 32.573 6.064? 8.673??
(Rest of the world) (1.079) (1.842) (24.346) (2.033) (1.179)
®1;C 0.073?? 0.066?? 0.021 0.143? 0.104??
(China) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.047) (0.013)
¾C 13.698?? 15.174?? 47.847 6.978? 9.588??
(China) (1.353) (2.33) (31.212) (2.319) (1.193)
®1;I 0.088?? 0.104?? 0.016 0.068? 0.125??
(India) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.034) (0.014)
¾I 11.363?? 9.569?? 64.102 14.706? 7.974??
(India) (0.899) (0.995) (63.471) (7.307) (0.888)
R-squares [0.14, 0.19] [0.08, 0.21] [0.01,0.03] [0.10,0.15] [0.16,0.18]
Number of observations [1499,1899] [419,603] [114,162] [116,130] [637,753]
Number of countries 10 4 2 1 3
aAll regressions use country-¯xed e®ects. White robust standard errors are provided in parentheses, both
for the coe±cients and the implied substitution parameters. ?? stands for statistical signi¯cance at the 1
percent level and ? stands for statistical signi¯cance at the 5 percent level. The table provides the range of
R-squares and number of observations of the regressions using data on imports from China, India and the
rest of the of the world.T
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